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Abstract 
Since changes in trade openness are typically confounded with other factors, it has been difficult to 
identify the labor market consequences of increased international trade. The advent of the United 
States Interstate Highway System provides a unique policy experiment, which I use to identify the 
effect of reducing trade barriers on the relative demand for skilled labor. The Interstate Highway 
System was designed to connect major metropolitan areas, to serve national defence and to connect 
the United States to Canada and Mexico. As a consequence – though not an objective – many rural 
counties were also connected to the highway system. I find that these counties experienced an 
increase in trade-related activities, such as trucking and retail sales, by 7-10 percentage points per 
capita. Most significantly, by increasing trade the highways raised the relative demand for skilled 
manufacturing workers in counties with a high endowment of human capital and reduced it elsewhere, 
consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of reducing global trade barriers on inequality has been the subject of intense
debate (Freeman 2004). In a two-factor H-O model with two economies, the removal of
trade barriers favors high-skilled workers in the skill-abundant developed world and low-
skilled workers in the less developed world. But recent work challenges the applicability of
the H-O framework for the analysis of the labor market consequences of trade.1 We therefore
have no consensus regarding the eﬀect of trade on the relative demand for skilled labor.
The principal empirical challenge in assessing the general-equilibrium eﬀect of interna-
tional trade on labor demand is identification. Recent work estimates the eﬀects of trade
liberalization (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 2003) and exchange rate shocks (Verhoogen
2004) on labor demand in developing countries. While these case-studies are informative,
they may be insuﬃcient to determine the eﬀect of removing trade barriers on the demand for
skill. First, the consequences of trade liberalization depend on the distribution of industrial
protection, while exchange rate shocks aﬀect exporters and importers in opposite ways. Sec-
ond, governments that liberalize trade or face rapid currency devaluation may aﬀect labor
markets directly. Finally, concurrent pervasive skill-biased technical change may also change
the demand for skill. Taking a diﬀerent approach, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) use
factor-content analysis to estimate the eﬀect of trade on wages. But as Panagariya (2000)
shows, these calculations rely on a fairly restrictive set of assumptions. To better understand
the eﬀect of trade on the demand for skill, we require exogenous variation in trade barriers
that aﬀects a wide range of industries and allows us to control for other concurrent changes
in the labor market equilibrium.
In this paper, I use the advent of the United States Interstate Highway System as an
interesting policy experiment to estimate the eﬀect of reducing trade barriers on the demand
1The H-O model cannot fully explain recent changes in worldwide labor demand (Krugman 1995; and
Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998). Against this backdrop, theoretical work suggests that reduced trade
barriers may increase the demand for skilled labor even in economies with a low skill endowment (Feenstra
and Hanson 1996; Acemoglu 2003; Kremer and Maskin 2003; Matsuyama 2004; and Antras, Garicano, and
Rossi-Hansberg 2005).
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for skill. The construction of the Interstate Highway System began after funding was ap-
proved in 1956, and by 1975 the system was mostly complete, spanning over 40,000 miles.
The highways were designed to address three policy goals. First, they were intended to
improve the connection between major metropolitan areas in the United States. Second,
they were planned to serve U.S. national defense. And finally, they were designed to con-
nect with major routes in Canada and Mexico. As a consequence — but not an objective —
many rural counties were also connected to the Interstate Highway System.2 Rural counties
crossed by the highways experienced an exogenous reduction in barriers to trade, providing
an opportunity to examine how product market integration aﬀects relative factor demand.3
I show that large trucks used the rural Interstate Highways much more intensively than
other types of vehicles. As the highway construction was being completed, the trucking
industry grew very rapidly and trucks became the primary mode for cross-county commerce.
I find that highways increased trucking income and retail sales by about 7-10 percent per
capita in rural counties they crossed, relative to other rural counties. This suggests that
highway counties took advantage of the reduction in trade barriers to increase their trade
with other counties.
I interpret the changes in highway counties, relative to non-highway counties, as the
mean eﬀect of reduced trade barriers. I interact this variation with pre-existing diﬀerences
in human capital endowment between the rural counties, as proxied by the fraction of high
school graduates among persons 25 years and older in 1950. I find that on average highways
did not change the wage-bill of (high-skilled) non-production workers relative to the wage-
bill of (low-skilled) production workers in manufacturing.4 But in rural counties that had
a highly educated workforce, highways increased the relative wage-bill of non-production
2An extensive literature, dating back to Fogel (1964) examines the eﬀects of transportation infrastructure
on growth. Of this literature, my approach is closest to Chandra and Thompson (2000), who estimate the
eﬀects of the Interstate Highway System on growth in rural counties.
3Horiba and Kirkpatrick (1981), Davis et al. (1997) and others use within-country variation in factor
endowments to test various predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. But this literature has not
identified exogenous variations in regional factor endowments or in trade barriers.
4I focus on manufacturing due to the availability of wage and employment data.
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workers, and where the workforce was less educated, highways decreased the relative wage-
bill of non-production workers. These results are robust to the inclusion of time-varying
controls for geographic location and land abundance. This finding is consistent with the
H-O prediction that trade increases the demand for skill where it is relatively abundant and
decreases it elsewhere.
Using my estimates I calculate the elasticity of the wage-bill of non-production workers
relative to production workers in manufacturing with respect to the ratio of domestic trade to
local GDP. In a county that exceeds the mean level of education by one standard deviation
this elasticity is roughly equal to 1. This finding suggests that trade may contribute to
changes in labor market inequality, but its eﬀects are not very large.5
Another prediction of the H-O model is that trade shifts employment towards industries
intensive in the relatively abundant factor. To test this prediction, I calculate a measure of
skill intensity of the manufacturing workforce in each county using data on 2-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries. I find that highways did not significantly shift
employment to skill-intensive manufacturing industries in skill-abundant counties, nor did
it shift employment to low-skill industries where skill was scarce. This finding suggests
that compositional changes may have taken place within industries or product classes.6
Alternatively, it is possibile that trade has increased the demand for skilled workers in skill-
abundant counties through other channels.
My interpretation that highways aﬀect county-level outcomes by removing trade barriers
faces several potential challenges. First, political agents may have changed highway routes
in response to economic or demographic conditions in rural counties, contrary to the original
planners’ intent. In order to address this concern, I instrument for highway location using
the original plan of routes proposed in 1944. I also construct a second instrument, based on
the fact that an Interstate Highway is more likely to run through a rural county that lies to
the north, south, east, or west of the nearest major city. Estimates using these instrumental
5However, it is possible that removing trade barriers across countries may have other eﬀects on inequality.
6Schott (2004) shows evidence of specialization within product classes in international trade.
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variables (IV) are consistent with the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. In addition, I
find that measures of trade and demand for skill do not diﬀer significantly between highway
and non-highway counties before highway construction was completed. Second, my empirical
strategy assumes that counties approximate separate labor markets. This assumption is
consistent with the finding of many recent studies that wage diﬀerences vary persistently
across regional markets in the United States.7 In the sample I use, about three-quarters of
the workers are employed in their county of residence, suggesting that counties are plausible
units for the analysis of local labor markets. My results also suggest that the eﬀect of
highways on the relative wage and relative employment of high skilled workers were the
same in sign. This finding is consistent with a change in the relative demand for skill, as we
would expect from opening to trade, so the eﬀect on the relative wage bill is unlikely driven
purely by migration. Finally, one might argue that highways could have aﬀected patterns
of commuting, changing the geographic skill distribution of employment. However, I find
that highways had little eﬀect on passenger car traﬃc, and that the fraction of workers who
commute to work did not increase in highway counties relative to other counties.
Section 2 describes a simple theoretical framework, which considers the eﬀects of trade
on the relative demand for skilled workers. Section 3 presents a brief historical overview of
the planning and construction of the Interstate Highway System. Section 4 discusses the
data and the samples I use. Section 5 discusses the eﬀects of highways on trade. Section
6 estimates the eﬀect of highways on the relative demand for skilled workers, and Section
7 reports estimates of their eﬀect on the industrial composition of employment. Section 8
presents conclusions.
2 Theoretical Framework
To frame the key questions of this investigation, it is useful to first discuss the theoretical
implications of reducing trade barriers on the demand for skill. I begin by discussing the
7See for example Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004); Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005); and Card and
DiNardo (2001).
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predictions of a Heckscher-Ohlin model, and then consider alternative models that predict
an eﬀect of trade on the demand for skill.
In a two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model with two economies and a continuum of goods,
patterns of trade are determined by diﬀerences in factor endowments (see Appendix A).
Focusing on high-skilled and low-skilled workers as the factors of interest, the model predicts
that a skill-abundant economy has a comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods, so the
skill content of its exports is higher than the skill content of its imports.
This model has several testable implications. First, opening to trade increases the relative
wage of the locally abundant factor; this may lead to factor price equalization, unless factor
endowments are very diﬀerent. Since the model assumes factor immobility (see discussion
below), this prediction implies that trade increases the relative wage bill of the abundant
factor in each economy. Second, trade shifts production to industries intensive in the locally
abundant factor. If factor prices are not equalized, each economy specializes in goods inten-
sive in the locally abundant factor. Finally, the model predicts that each industry becomes
relatively more intensive in the locally scarce good. Unfortunately, due to data limitations I
am unable to examine this last prediction of the model.
The predictions outlined above are robust to allowing free migration of workers between
the two economies (see Appendix B). Suppose each economy has a fixed supply of housing
and people spend a constant fraction of their income on housing. Assume for example that
skilled workers prefer to live in the home economy.8 If migration is possible but trade is too
costly, the home economy is more skill-abundant, and therefore has a lower skill premium
and higher price of housing. Opening to trade increases the demand for skilled labor in
the home economy, raising the relative wage-bill share of skilled workers through inflows of
high-skilled workers and outflows of low-skilled workers.
The two-factor model may be extended to include capital, and its predictions hold as
8If workers do not prefer either economy and migration is costless then the skill endowments of both
economies are identical (assuming both are populated). The assumption of diﬀerent preferences yields
diﬀerences in endowment and motivates trade.
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long as free flow of capital equalizes the interest rate. Including land as another factor of
production can change the model’s predictions, so in the following sections I test whether
controlling for diﬀerences in land abundance aﬀects the outcomes of interest.
Trade may also aﬀect the demand for skill in other ways, and recent work suggests
that opening to trade may increase the demand for skill everywhere. Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) suggest that trade allows goods that require an intermediate level of skill to be
outsourced from high-skilled economies to low-skilled economies, raising the demand for
skill in both. Matsuyama (2006) argues that in an international setting exporting is more
skill-intensive than selling on the local market, so reducing trade barriers could favor skilled
workers everywhere. If a similar mechanism applies in the domestic U.S. setting, trade may
increase the demand for skilled workers even where skill is scarce. A similar result may
occur if the assumption of identical and homothetic preferences is violated. For example,
Leonardi (2003) argues that wealthier and more educated workers tend to consume more
skill-intensive goods, so if trade increases income it could favor skilled workers.
In order to test the eﬀect of an exogenous reduction in trade barriers on the demand
for skilled labor, consider two potential trading blocs. Each bloc consists of two economies,
one of which is more skill-abundant. To make the link with the empirical work in the next
section, I now propose to think of the economies in each trading bloc as counties. Initially,
the counties in each bloc are autarkic, and relative wages are determined by local supply
and demand. Highways are then constructed between the economies of one bloc, allowing
them to trade. Thus we expect that highways increase trade flows between those counties,
and I can thanexamine the eﬀect of opening to trade on the dmand for skilled labor and
the industry composition. But before testing these predictions, I trace the origins of the
interstate highways and study their role in reducing trade barriers.
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3 History of the Interstate Highway System
The Interstate Highway System provides a natural experiment that I envision as inducing
an exogenous reduction in trade barriers. During the first half of the 20th century much
of the economic activity in the United States was highly localized, as distances were long
and transcontinental travel was slow. Lewis (1997) describes President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s early interest in constructing a national network of highways to reduce travel
time:
Given his interest in road building, it is little wonder that early in 1937
[President] Roosevelt called Thomas MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public
Roads, to the White House. On a map of the United States, the president had
drawn three lines north and south and three lines east and west. These would
be the routes for a new transcontinental system of interstate toll highways, he
explained.
This grid pattern persisted in all the subsequent modifications of the highway plan; the
next section describes how I use it to construct an instrument for the highway system.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 laid out a plan for a system of highways designed
"To connect by routes as direct as practicable the principal metropolitan areas, cities and
industrial centers, to serve the national defense and to connect suitable border points with
routes of continental importance in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico."9
Although rural areas were not considered by the planners, highways were designed to cross
many rural counties as an unintended consequence of meeting these policy goals.
The construction of the Interstate Highway System began following the approval of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which also changed planned routes of the highways.10
The legislation stipulated that access to the highways be free, except for a few existing toll
9Public Roads Administration press release (1947). Figure 2 shows the layout of the plan.
10In subsequent years further changes were made to the design of the system, but they were relatively
minor.
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highways incorporated into the Interstate Highway System. The federal government bore
90 percent of the cost of construction, while the states financed the remaining 10 percent.
Figure 3 shows that in 1966 the highways were still mostly disconnected—thick lines show
constructed sections, while thin lines show planned sections. By 1975, however, almost all
the sections had been completed (see Figure 4).
4 Data and Samples
I use a number of data sources to construct the sample of Interstate Highways. First, the
National Transportation Atlas Databases (2002) identifies the exact routes of the highways.
Second, I use historical data to restrict the sample to highways that were mostly constructed
from 1959-1975. I exclude state-interstate highway cells for which the 1975 mileage was less
than 80 percent of the 2002 mileage.11 Using maps issued by the Bureau of Public Roads
and the Federal Highway Administration, I exclude state-interstate highway cells where the
1959 mileage exceeded 20 percent of the 1975 mileage. This selection criterion excludes toll
highways, which were constructed before 1959 and later incorporated into the Interstate
Highway System. Third, I restrict the sample to longer highways, which more likely connect
distant locations (as envisioned by the early planners), and are therefore less aﬀected by
local economic conditions. I therefore exclude all 3-digit highways, which serve metropolitan
areas, and restrict the sample to highways whose total remaining length exceeds 500 miles.
This leaves most segments of 18 highways, half of which run primarily north and south and
half of which run primarily east and west. Together these segments extend over more than
24,000 miles, more than half of the total length of the Interstate Highway System.
The Interstate Highways were constructed in all 48 contiguous states, but they only
crossed some counties, aﬀording substantial within-state variation. Counties are a meaning-
ful geographic unit for the analysis of labor markets, since from 1970-1990 only about 20-30
percent of workers in rural counties commuted to work outside their county of residence.
11To determine the length of each highway in December 1975 in every state, I use the Interstate Gap Study
(1976); this study is a report to Congress by the Department of Transportation.
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Publicly available micro data do not identify individuals’ county of residence, so I use aggre-
gate county-level data from various sources. First, County and City Data Books provide data
on earnings and employment of production and non-production workers in manufacturing,
retail sales, schooling, and population. Second, Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Eco-
nomic Accounts give data on earnings in trucking and warehousing. Third, County Business
Patterns present information on the industrial composition of manufacturing. Finally, the
National Transportation Atlas Database allows me to ascertain the geographic location of
counties and cities. I limit the sample to counties whose population in 1950 was more than
50 percent rural and whose land area changed by no more than 5 percent from 1950-1980.
I also exclude counties that had one or more highway segments running through them, but
no segment was constructed between 1959-1975.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of counties. Sample counties were
predominantly rural in 1950, so they were more sparsely populated and somewhat poorer
than non-sample counties. About three-quarters of the mileage was planned for construction
on new right-of-way, most likely due to the high cost of land adjacent to existing highways.
This suggests that highway counties may have been negatively selected compared to non-
highway counties. But Table 1 shows that highway counties were somewhat richer and
experienced faster population growth even before the construction of the highways. These
diﬀerential rates of population growth motivate an analysis that compares counties in per
capita terms and examines the possibility of pre-existing trends in key variables.
Although the Interstate Highways were not intended to serve rural counties, their routes
may have been changed by political considerations correlated with the economic conditions
that prevailed after World War II. I therefore use an indicator for having a highway planned
in 1944 (z1c) as an instrument for the location of the interstate highway system.12
I use the geographic variation in the allocation of highways to counties to generate a
12In concurrent and independent research, Baum-Snow (2004) looks at the eﬀect of highways on population
growth in suburban areas. He uses a 1947 map of the Interstate Highway System to construct an instrument
for the routes of highways in metropolitan areas. Lahr et al. (2005) also examine the eﬀect of highways on
the size of metropolitan areas.
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second instrument. Figure 5 shows a key feature of the Interstate Highway System, dating
back to President Roosevelt: routes are mostly along lines of latitude and longitude. Since
highways were also planned to connect cities, I calculate the orientation of the nearest large
city with respect to each county’s geographic centroid:13
Ac =
90
(π/2)
arcsin
µ
(eyc − yc) /q(exc − xc)2 + (eyc − yc)2¶ , (1)
where (xc, yc) and (exc, eyc) are the coordinates of the county centroid and the nearest city.
I use this measure to construct an instrument for the probability that a county received a
highway: z2c =
|45−|Ac||
45
.
Figure 6 plots a kernel regression of the probability that a highway crosses a county as
a function of the orientation. If you live in a rural county and the nearest major city is to
your north, east, or west, the odds of having an interstate run through your county are much
better than if the city’s orientation if oﬀ one of the major axes.
To test if the two instruments aﬀect the probability that a highway crosses a county, I
estimate the following cross-section regressions of the form:
hc = αzc + βxc + εc, (2)
where hc is an indicator for a segment of the Interstate Highway System crossing county
c, zc includes either (or both) instruments z1c, z2c, and εc is a residual. The county level
controls, xc, vary across specifications, and include region fixed eﬀects and the distance from
the county centroid to the nearest city. Table 2 shows that the instrument based on the
1944 plan is a very strong predictor of the routes along which highways were eventually
constructed. The instrument based on the direction to the nearest city also has substantial
13The sample of cities is constructed using 1950 population data. It includes the most populous city in each
state and any city that had at least 100,000 persons. The resulting sample includes 119 cities. I calculated
the geographic centroid of each county using the Geographic Information System.
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predictive power for the location of highways.14
5 The Eﬀect of Highways on Trade
In this section I estimate the eﬀect of the Interstate Highway System on domestic trade.
By allowing traﬃc to flow more rapidly, the highways reduced barriers to domestic trade,
facilitating cross-county commerce. Since I have no data on county level imports and exports
to the rest of the nation, I measure correlates of domestic commerce - trucking and retail sales.
I find that trucks used rural highways very intensively, and aggregate data suggests that the
Interstate Highway System contributed to the growth of the trucking industry. Next, I show
that highway counties experienced a large increase in trucking and retail sales relative to
other counties after the Interstate Highway System was completed. While highways appear
to have aﬀected trade, I show that cross-county commuting did not change diﬀerentially for
highway counties relative to other counties. Finally, I discuss the implications of highways
for the equalization of prices and wages.
The Interstate Highway System consists almost entirely of four-lane, divided highways
with controlled and limited access. As such, it allows vehicles to travel more safely and
at higher speeds in rural areas. Data from 1982-1991 suggests that the average speed of
vehicles on rural Interstate Highways was at least 6-9 percent higher than the average speed
on other rural principal and minor arterials and 10-15 percent higher than the average speed
on rural major collectors.15 In addition, rural Interstate Highways allow traﬃc to bypass
small urban areas, allowing even larger time gains. Since the late 1970s, rural Interstate
Highways have carried about 8 percent of the total passenger car traﬃc and 11 percent of
single-unit truck traﬃc in the U.S. In contrast, rural Interstate Highways have borne over 30
percent of the total traﬃc of combination trucks, which are typically designed to transport
14I later use the instruments to test if outcomes change diﬀerentially over time for highway and non-
highway counties. For that purpose I interact each instrument with a dummy for post-1975, and use this
interaction term to instrument for the interaction of the highway dummy with post-1975. The first stage for
the interacted regression is essentially identical to the results in Table 2.
15The data are from the National Transportation Statistics 1993, Table 13.
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large volumes over long distances (Table 3).16 In fact, in the past couple of decades trucks
account for almost one-fifth of the traﬃc on rural Interstate Highways. It thus appears that
the Interstate Highway System has proved very important for the trucking industry.
During the 1970s, as the Interstate Highway System opened for traﬃc, the use of com-
bination trucks expanded much more rapidly than in previous or subsequent decades (see
Figure 7).17 In 1969, the ratio of earnings in the trucking and warehousing industry over
earnings in the railroad industry was about 1.7; by 1997 this ratio increased to almost 4.8
(Regional Economic Accounts 2004). By then trucks transported more than 71 percent of
the value of domestic trade in the United States.18 Thus, the aggregate evidence suggests
that the Interstate Highway System facilitated domestic trade by allowing a more extensive
use of trucks.
My interpretation of the eﬀect of the Interstate Highway System on economic outcomes
assumes that they reduced barriers to trade across counties. In 1997 most of the domestic
trade in the U.S. — about 58 percent — was conducted across state borders; this is clearly a
very low bound on cross-county trade. In fact, almost two-thirds of the value of commodities
transported by truck were shipped for at least 50 miles and therefore, most likely, across
county borders.19 These figures are consistent with the view that the highways are important
for cross-county trade.
The evidence presented thus far pertains to aggregate trends, but we can also examine
the eﬀect of highways on rural counties they crossed, relative to other rural counties. I have
no county-level measure of real trucking activity, such as miles traveled or value of goods
transported. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does, however, provide county-level data on
16A combination truck consists of a truck tractor and at least one trailer unit.
17Federal regulations that govern the weight and dimensions of trucks and other motor vehicles were first
enacted in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. They were subsequently revised in 1975 and 1983 (U.S.
House of Representatives, 2002). It is therefore highly unlikely that the increased use of combination trucks
in the first half of the 1970’s was caused by such regulation.
18Commodity Flow Survey (1997). If we include commodities transported by multiple modes of trans-
portation these figures are even higher.
19If we the median county in the sample were a square, it would measure about 25 miles on a side. The
maximum linear distance to traverse within such a square is about 35 miles.
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earnings in the trucking and warehousing industry. I use this data to estimate specifications
of the form:
Tct = ψc + ρt + αthc + εct, (3)
where Tct is log earnings in the trucking and warehousing industries per capita in county c
at time t; ψc and ρt are county fixed eﬀects and year eﬀects; αt is a time-varying coeﬃcient
on the indicator for highway counties, hc; and εct is a residual. Recall from Table 1 that
highway counties are on average closer to large cities. To check that the estimates are not
driven by diﬀerential trends for counties with diﬀerent locations or land-abundance, some
specifications control for time-varying eﬀects of region, distance from the county centroid to
the nearest city, and 1950 population density.
The results (Table 4 and Figure 8) indicate that earnings in the trucking and warehousing
industry, per capita, increased in highway counties relative to non-highway counties. Most
of the increase took place during the 1970s, consistent with the timing of the construction
of the Interstate Highway System. It is possible that non-highway counties also benefitted
from the highways, although to a lesser extent. Conversely, some trucking activity may
have shifted from non-highway counties to highway counties. Thus we can only identify the
diﬀerential eﬀect of highways on highway counties relative to non-highway counties.20
The results in Table 4 suggest that highways indeed facilitated the flow of commodities.
However, these findings do not rule out the possibility that truckers reside in highway counties
and transfer goods used in other counties. To further substantiate the hypothesis that
highways increased the flow of commerce in counties they crossed, I estimate their eﬀect on
retail sales. Specifically, I regress log retail sales per capita on the same regressors as in (3);
similar specifications control for other covariates. The results (Table 5 and Figure 8) show
that highway counties experienced a rapid increase in retail sales relative to non-highway
counties since the 1970s. The results also indicate that highway and non-highway counties
displayed similar trends before and during the highway construction. Given that highways
20The available data also does not account for trucks used by firms outside the trucking industry.
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also increased trucking, it appears very likely that the increase in retail sales is due to goods
“imported” from outside the county.21
In order to address the concern that the results may be aﬀected by selection, I also
estimate the eﬀect of highways on trucking and retail sales using the instrumental variables
described in the previous section. Table 6 presents estimates using specification of the form:
Yct = ψc + ρt + βd1975hc + εct, (4)
where Yct is the outcome and d1975 is an indicator for post-1975, when the highway segments
in the sample were mostly complete. Another specification substitutes a state-level index
of highway completion for the post-1975 indicator.22 Finally, I also estimate this equation
using IV, where zc,1d1975 or zc,2d1975 serve as instruments for hcd1975.
OLS estimates suggest that highways increased retail sales per capita by 8-10 percentage
points and IV estimates using the 1944 plan give a similar result. Using the direction
instrument, rather than the 1944 plan, gives estimates that are larger and less precise. When
I limit the sample to the Midwest and South, where the first stage is larger, the IV estimates
are twice as large as the OLS estimates and marginally significant. The OLS estimates for
earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita also increased by about 8-10 percentage
points. The IV estimates are less precise, but they are similar to the OLS estimates. These
results are consistent with the view that highways aﬀected economic outcomes by changing
the patterns of trade.
21Highways could increase retail sales per capita for a number of reasons. First, H-O theory predicts that
trade will increase income, thereby raising average consumption (see Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson
1980). Second, if highways facilitate market integration of rural areas, sales may shift to formal establish-
ments, further raising sales of retailers. Finally, it is possible that retailers will make capital investments
complementary to the highways, further increasing their sales.
22The benchmark specification assumes that highways aﬀected outcomes only after 1975, when they were
essentially complete. In order to relax this assumption, I calculate a state-level index of highway completion
using the length of rural interstate highways with four lanes and restricted access control that were open to
traﬃc. Since most of the interstate highways that were open to traﬃc in 1960 were toll roads incorporated
into the system, I exclude them from my analysis. Thus, the state-level index measures if the mileage of
highways in a given year, net of the 1960 mileage, accounts for more than 90 percent of the diﬀerence between
the 1975 mileage and the 1960 mileage.
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In the following analysis, I interpret the eﬀect of highways on the labor market as a
consequence of the removal of trade barriers. One potential concern about this interpretation
is that highways may also aﬀect patterns of commuting, thereby changing the geographic
skill distribution of employment. Figure 7, however, suggests that rural Interstate Highways
had little aggregate eﬀect on passenger traﬃc. The final outcome in Table 6 is the fraction
of workers, who commute to work outside their county of residence. The results show that
commuting did not significantly increase in rural highway counties, compared to other rural
counties.
A related concern is that migration patterns may be correlated with highway location for
reasons other than a change in labor demand. My estimates suggest that highway counties
experienced a faster rate of population growth both before and after the highways were
constructed, with no evidence of a change in trend (results not shown). In the next section
I discuss the possibility that highways changed the relative supply of skill, rather than the
relative demand.
The theoretical framework also predicts that where costless trade is possible, commodity
prices (though not necessarily factor prices) will be equal. The Interstate Highway System
appears to have significantly reduced the cost of trade in commodities. While I have no direct
evidence on price changes in rural areas, Parsley and Wei (1996) use data from 1975-1992
and find rapid convergence of commodity prices across U.S. cities. This finding is consistent
with the theory, since all major U.S. cities are connected to the Interstate Highway System.
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005) find that wage diﬀerences persist across geographically
disparate labor markets in the U.S.; this suggests that factor endowment diﬀerences may
have prevented factor price equalization.
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6 The Eﬀect of Highways on the Relative Demand for Skilled
Labor
This section examines the eﬀect of opening to trade on the relative demand for skilled labor.
The H-O model predicts that by facilitating trade, highways increase the relative wage-bill
of non-production workers in counties with a highly skilled workforce and decrease it in
counties with a less educated workforce.23 To test this prediction I interact the exogenous
reduction in the cost of trade caused by the Interstate Highway System with pre-existing
diﬀerences in human capital endowment. As explained in Section 4, there are no micro data
that identify individuals’ county of residence during the relevant time period. I therefore
use the fraction of high school educated workers among persons 25 years and older in 1950,
before the Interstate Highway System was constructed, as a measure of a county’s skill
endowment.24 I use non-production and production workers in manufacturing as proxies for
high- and low-skilled labor, respectively.25
In order to examine this prediction I estimate a regression of the form:
ln
¡
SHct
¢
= ψc + ρt + βd1975hc + γd1975hcsc,1950 + δd1975sc,1950 + εct, (5)
where ln
¡
SHct
¢
= ln
¡
ωHcthct
¢
= ln
¡
wHct/wLct
¢
− ln (Hct/Lct) denotes the wage-bill of non-
production workers in manufacturing, relative to production workers. The fraction of high
school graduates among persons 25 years and older in 1950 is sc,1950, and d1975 is a dummy
for post-1975.26 Other specifications include county-level covariates, and IV estimates using
z1,c and z2,c, interacted with appropriate terms, to instrument for terms that include the
highway dummy, hc.
23As Table 1 shows, the sample counties are on average less skill abundant than the rest of the US.
However, there is considerable variation in the sample counties’ skill endowment, and about a quarter of the
sample of counties had a higher fraction of high-school graduates than the US average in 1950.
24Using 1960 schooling data gives similar results.
25Census data for 1960 and 1980 indicate that non-production workers in manufacturing industries had
about 2-3 more years of education than production workers. For further discussion of the diﬀerences between
production and non-production workers see Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994).
26These regressions are weighted by 1950 population, since data for low population counties are less precise.
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The first column of Panel A in Table 7 presents estimates of this equation under the
constraint that γ = δ = 0. The results show that on average, highways did not increase the
relative demand for skill. Subsequent columns relax this constraint, and test the prediction
that β < 0 and γ > 0. These results do suggest that highways significantly increased
the relative demand for non-production workers in counties that had a highly skilled labor
force and reduced it elsewhere. The results are robust to controlling for the contemporaneous
fraction of high school graduates in the labor force and for time-varying coeﬃcients on region
dummies, distance from the county to the nearest city, and 1950 population density. The IV
estimates using the 1944 plan are somewhat larger estimates than the OLS estimates, while
the direction instrument is not precise enough to identify the eﬀect of highways on labor
demand.27
The results in Panels B and C of Table 7 suggest that highways increased both the
relative wages and the employment share of non-production workers in high-skill counties,
although most estimates are not precise. Similarly, highways appear to have reduced the
wages and employment of non-production workers where skill was relatively scarce. These
results are consistent with the H-O view, that trade shifts the relative demand curve for
skilled labor. The change in wages and employment shares may reflect a movement along
the relative supply curve for skilled workers. The positive and finite elasticity of the relative
supply of skill may reflect endogenous cross-county migration as well as changes that took
place within counties, such as occupational transition and entry or exit of workers from the
market.
I use the results in Table 7 to evaluate the possibility that the eﬀect of highways on the
27To test the hypothesis that the eﬀect of highways on the relative wage-bill of skilled manufacturing
workers varies by land endowment I add the interaction (1950 population density)*(post 1975)* highway to
the specification in Table 7, panel A, column 3. This changes beta from -0.168 (0.068) to -0.177 (0.070) and
gamma from 0.609 (0.241) to 0.605 (0.244), suggesting that land endowment has little eﬀect on the outcome
of interest. Taking the same baseline specification and controlling for a county-level index of skill intensity in
manufacturing in 1967 (described in the Appendix) interacted with year dummies yields estimates of -0.153
(0.074) and 0.462 (0.253) for beta and gamma, indicating that these results are also not driven by diﬀerential
time eﬀects on counties with diﬀerent industry compositions.
The results are also robust when I restrict the sample to counties that are farther than 50km from the
nearest city.
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wage-bill are due to changes in relative supply correlated with highway location, rather than
a change in relative demand. Assume that the aggregate elasticity of substitution between
high- and low-skilled workers is locally a constant, η, then the elasticity of the relative
wage-bill of skilled workers with respect to their wages is:
∂ ln
¡
wHct/wLct
¢
∂ [ln (Hct/Lct)]
= −1
η
. (6)
There is a consensus in the literature that η is higher than 1 (e.g. Freeman 1986; Katz and
Murphy 1992; and the elasticity implied in Angrist 1995). Using these estimates, the eﬀect
of highways (and highways interacted with 1950 schooling) on relative employment should
have been bigger in magnitude than their eﬀect on relative wages, and opposite in sign.
Thus, the estimates in Table 7 suggest that highways changed the relative demand for skill,
rather than the relative supply of skill.
As a further check, I test if highway counties experienced changes in the wage-bill of
non-production workers, relative to production workers, before the highways were completed
or after they were already in place. By time-diﬀerencing (5) (post-1975 minus pre-1975) we
get an expression for the change in the relative wage-bill of non-production workers:
∆ ln
¡
SHc
¢
= ρ+ βhc + γhcsc,1950 + δsc,1950 + εc. (7)
I estimate this equation using OLS (with and without county-level controls) and IV, instru-
menting hc and hcsc,1950 using zi,c and zi,csc,1950, where i = 1, 2. Since data is not available for
all counties and all years, I restrict myself to a constant sample of counties, for which I have
data in 1947, 1967, 1982, and 1992. The results (Table 8) show that before the construc-
tion of highways was complete (1947-1967) the changes in the relative demand for skill did
not vary significantly between highway and non-highway counties. This is true for both the
OLS estimates (with and without county-level controls) and the IV estimates using the 1944
plan. As before, the direction instrument is not powerful enough to give precise results. The
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estimates for 1967-1982 are similar in magnitude to those found in Table 7. The estimate of
the main eﬀect of highways, γ, is statistically significant only in the IV estimate, while the
estimate of δ is significant in all specifications. Finally, the changes that took place from
1982-1992 do not vary significantly across highway and non-highway counties. These results
lend support to the hypothesis the Interstate Highway System was indeed the cause of the
changes in the relative demand for skilled labor.
In order to assess the magnitude of the eﬀect of trade I compare my estimates to those of
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997). Borjas et al. use a factor-content approach to measuring
the eﬀect of trade on wage inequality. They find that imports to the U.S. from less-developed
countries as a fraction of GDP increased by about 1.6 percentage points from 1980-1995.
Using factor-content analysis they calculate that this increase could have raised the skill
premium by about 0.9− 1 percentage points.28 This suggests that the elasticity of the skill
premium with respect to (Imports/GDP) was about 0.6.
Using my estimates for trucking (Table 4) I assume that highways increased trade by
about 7 percentage points in counties they crossed, relative to other counties. Data from the
commodity flow survey of 1997 suggests that value of goods traded domestically in the U.S.
was roughly equal to the GDP. I assume that during the 1970s the ratio of domestic trade to
GDP was about 0.9. This suggests that the change in (domestic trade/local GDP) induced
in highway counties, relative to other counties, was about 0.063. In 1950, the fraction of
high school graduates in the mean county in the sample was 0.251 with a standard deviation
of 0.103. The OLS estimate of the eﬀect of highways on the relative wage-bill of high-skilled
workers (Table 7 Panel A, column 2) in a county that is one standard deviation above the
mean level of education is 0.072 (p-value 0.03). The IV estimate (Table 7 Panel A, column 6)
is 0.061 (p-value 0.12). This suggests that the elasticity of the relative wage-bill with respect
to (domestic trade/local GDP) for a county that is one standard deviation above the mean
28This figure reflects the change in wages of college graduates relative to high-school graduates and of
high-school graduates compared to high-school dropouts.
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level of education is close to 1.29 The estimates of the skill premium are somewhat smaller
in magnitude and less precise.
The assumptions used in this paper are quite diﬀerent from those used in the factor-
content analysis of Borjas et al. (1997).30 However, despite the diﬀerences in assumptions
and sources of variation, the magnitude of our estimates appears quite comparable. My
results therefore support the view that while trade may contribute to changes in labor market
inequality, its eﬀects are limited in magnitude.
7 The Eﬀect of Highways on the Industrial Composition
The H-O framework also predicts that trade changes the industry composition of employ-
ment. Specifically, it predicts that trade causes a skill-abundant economy to shift its produc-
tion towards more skill-intensive goods and vice versa for an economy where skill is scarce.
In order to test this prediction I construct a measure of the skill intensity of each industry.
I match the two-digit SIC codes to the 1950 classification of manufacturing industries in
the household census and compute the fraction of non-production workers each industry’s
labor force. Using the County Business Patterns data I compute an index of the skill in-
tensity of the manufacturing workforce: Ict =
P
i ni,1960Iict, where ni,1960 is the fraction of
non-production workers employed in industry i in 1960 and Iict is the fraction (or estimated
fraction) of the manufacturing employees in county c employed in industry i at time t. See
Appendix C for details on the construction of the data.
To test whether trade changed the industrial composition of employment in manufactur-
ing, I estimate regressions of the following form:
Ict = ψc + ρt + βd1975hc + γd1975hcsc,1950 + δd1975sc,1950 + εct. (8)
29Similar calculations yield estimates that are close to 0 for a county with the mean level of education and
about −1.3 for a county that is one s.d. below the mean level of education.
30Factor-content analysis typically assumes the absence of non-competing imports, no endogenous response
of factor supplies to trade, and identical elasticities of substitution across all production functions and the
utility function (Panagariya 2000).
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I estimate the equation using OLS and IV, instrumenting the various interactions of the
highway dummy with corresponding interactions of the two instruments. The estimated
coeﬃcients of interest, β and γ, are of the expected sign, but they are not statistically
significant in any of the specifications (Table 9). Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that
trade has no eﬀect on the industrial composition of employment.31
There are two possible ways to interpret the absence of significant eﬀects of removing
trade barriers on industrial composition. One approach is to interpret these results as evi-
dence that the theoretical framework outlined in section 2 may be incomplete. For example,
there may be frictions that restrict the mobility of labor across industries. My findings may
also suggest that endogenous migration may have played only a limited role, since migration
is likely to have reinforced the eﬀects of trade on industrial composition (see Appendix B).32
In related work, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) survey a number of recent studies that find
very little eﬀect of tariﬀ reductions on industry composition in developing countries. These
studies attribute their findings to imperfections of product markets or labor markets.
Alternatively, it is possible that my estimation strategy is not precise enough to estimate
such eﬀects.33 For example, it may be that changes in labor demand have taken place at
lower levels of industry aggregation or even within product classes (Schott 2004). Moreover,
the absence of accurate employment data in many county-industry cells requires a process
of imputation that may have resulted in non-negligible measurement error (see Appendix
C). Further research may be needed to determine the extent to which the removal of trade
barriers aﬀects the industrial composition.
31Note that even if factors are not perfectly mobile across industries, trade could still aﬀect the relative
demand for skill by changing the relative prices of commodities.
32However, Card and Lewis (2005) find that even inflows of low-skilled workers had limited eﬀects on
the industrial composition in U.S. cities. Lewis (2005) argues that firms may vary the skill intensity of the
production technique in response to migration.
33Revenga (1992) finds that U.S. industries faced with increasing import competition due to changes in
exchange rates did reduce their employment and relative wages.
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8 Concluding Remarks
The literature on international trade suggests that trade may aﬀect the demand for skill, but
it has proved diﬃcult to identify this eﬀect, since identification requires exogenous variation
in the barriers to trade. In this paper I use the advent of the U.S. Interstate Highway System
as a source of exogenous variation in trade barriers. The Interstate Highway System was
built to better connect large cities, to serve national defense, and to connect with major
routes in Canada and Mexico. As an unintended consequence of meeting these objectives,
the highways crossed many rural counties. I find that the rural Interstate Highways were
particularly important for the flow of large trucks. These highways increased trucking activity
and retail sales by about 7-10 percentage points per capita in rural counties they crossed,
relative to other rural counties.
Using the Interstate Highway System as a source of variation for trade, I test whether
trade aﬀected the demand for skill in rural areas. I find that on average, highways had no
eﬀect on the demand for high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers in manufacturing.
However, highways increased the wage-bill of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled
workers in counties where skill was abundant, and reduced it where skill was scarce. This
finding is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin view that trade increases the relative demand
for the abundant factor. However, the magnitude of the eﬀect is quite small: in a county
that exceeds the mean level of education by one standard deviation, the elasticity of the
wage-bill of non-production workers relative to production workers in manufacturing with
respect to the ratio of domestic trade to local GDP is roughly equal to 1. In addition, I find
no evidence for the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model that trade significantly shifts the
industrial composition of employment towards industries intensive in the abundant factor.
This result suggests that changes in skill composition in response to reduced trade barriers
may have taken place within industries or product classes, or that trade may have increased
the demand for skill in skill-abundant counties through other channels.
My findings suggest that the ongoing expansion of trade between economies that diﬀer
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in their skill endowment, such as trade between the developed world and the less-developed
world, may continue to contribute to changes in labor market inequality. However, my results
also indicate that opening to trade is not likely to explain a great deal of the variation in
the demand for skill experienced by many countries in recent years.
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Appendix A. Heckscher-Ohlin Model
In this appendix I extend the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods of Dorn-
busch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980). The model assumes that diﬀerences in factor endow-
ments determine the patterns and consequences of trade. The analysis begins with a single
closed economy, and then considers two economies that diﬀer only in their endowments and
trade with each other. The model predicts that trade increases demand for the relatively
abundant factor and shifts employment towards industries intensive in that factor. These
predictions persist even when factor prices are not equalized and when migration between
the economies is possible.
Consider an economy with two factors of production: a continuum H of high-skilled
workers and a continuum L of low-skilled workers. There is a continuum of goods z on the
interval [0, 1]. The production function for each good is
Q(z) = Fz (H(z), L(z)) , (9)
where H(z) and L(z) are the employment of high- and low-skilled labor in industry z.
I assume that the production functions are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increase in
each of the arguments (with diminishing marginal returns), and satisfy constant returns to
scale and the Inada conditions. The goods are ranked in a strictly decreasing order of skill
intensity in production and there are no factor intensity reversals.34 I assume that all factor
and product markets are perfectly competitive with profit-maximizing firms and free entry.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor of her type. Consumers are assumed
to have an identical Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U =
Z 1
0
b(z) ln d(z)dz, (10)
34In other words, I assume that the ranking of industries in terms of their relative skill intensity is invariant
to factor prices.
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where d(z) is the quantity of good z consumed, and
Z 1
0
b(z)dz = 1. (11)
The model thus assumes that income eﬀects and diﬀerences in preferences play no role in
determining the patterns of trade.
Closed Economy Equilibrium
I examine the existence and properties of a closed economy equilibrium, which is charac-
terized by individual optimization, producer optimization and market-clearing. First, indi-
viduals maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint, so they spend a constant
fraction b(z) of their income on each good z at all prices and all levels of income.
Second, firms are competitive, so they maximize their profits
π(z) = P (z)Q(z)− wHH(z)− wLL(z), (12)
where wH and wL are the wage rates for high- and low-skilled workers, and P (z) is the price
of good z. Free entry implies a zero profit condition:
P (z)Q(z) = wHH(z) + wLL(z). (13)
Finally, the equality of supply and demand for every good implies:
P (z)Q(z) = b(z) (wHH + wLL) . (14)
Combining the last two expressions we get:
x(z) ≡ L(z)/L = b(z)(1 + ωh)
1 + ωh(ω; z)
, (15)
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where x(z) the intensity of low-skilled labor in industry z relative to the economy as a whole,
ω = wH/wL is the skill premium. The ratio of low- to high-skilled workers employed in the
entire economy and in the production of good z are h = H/L and h(ω; z) = H(ω; z)/L(ω; z).
The market-clearing conditions for low- and high-skill labor are
Z 1
0
x(z)dz = 1 and
Z 1
0
x(z)h(ω; z)dz = h. (16)
Combining these expressions we get an equilibrium condition for the closed economy as
a whole:
φ(ω;h) ≡
Z 1
0
b(z)(1 + ωh)
1 + ωh(ω; z)
[h(ω; z)− h] dz = 0. (17)
Since the production functions satisfy the Inada conditions, there are low values of ω
such that h(ω; z) is higher than h for all z and hence φ(ω;h) is positive at those values of
ω; similarly, there high values of ω for which φ(ω;h) is negative. Because the production
functions are assumed to be neoclassical, φ() is continuous in ω. Thus there exists an
equilibrium level of skill premium in autarky, ω = ωA.
Next we note that φ(ω;h) is strictly decreasing in ω:
∂φ(ω;h)
∂ω
< 0, (18)
so the equilibrium skill premium is unique. The leftmost curve in Figure 1 shows the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium skill premium in the closed home economy. Given the
equilibrium skill premium, ωA, relative price structure and the supply and demand of each
good are uniquely determined.
Predictably, an increase in the skill endowment of the economy reduces the skill premium:
∂φ(ω;h)
∂h
|φ=0 = −1⇒ ∂ω
A
∂h
=
∙
∂φ(ω;h)
∂ω
¸−1
< 0. (19)
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Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider opening the economy to trade with another such economy, which diﬀers only in
its factor endowments. The foreign economy has a high-skilled labor force of size H∗ and a
low-skilled labor force of size L∗. The foreign economy is assumed to have a lower fraction of
skilled workers: h∗ ≡ H∗/L∗ < h. Figure 1 demonstrates that the equilibrium skill premium
in the foreign economy, ωA∗, is higher than the skill premium in the home economy, as shown
in (19).
First I analyze the equilibrium where the fraction of skilled workers does not diﬀer greatly
between the two economies, so trade equalizes factor prices (of course, if the fraction is
identical trade has no eﬀect).
Denote the home economy’s share of low-skilled labor by ξ = L/(L + L∗). The ratio of
the stock of high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers in the two economies together is
bh ≡ H +H∗
L+ L∗
= ξh+ (1− ξ)h∗. (20)
Since factor prices are equal in both economies and the production technology is assumed
to be identical, the factor requirements in producing both goods are the same in the two
countries.
The equilibrium conditions for high-skilled labor in the two countries are:
H =
Z 1
0
α(z)b(z)c(z) [(wLL+ wHH) + (wLL∗ + wHH∗)]
P (z)
dz and
H∗=
Z 1
0
(1− α(z)) b(z)c(z) [(wLL+ wHH) + (wLL∗ + wHH∗)]
P (z)
dz, (21)
where α(z) is the fraction of total output of good z produced in the home economy. Producing
one unit of commodity z requires a(z) units of low-skilled labor and c(z) units of high-skilled
labor.
Combining the equations above we get an expression for the stock of high-skilled workers
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relative to low-skilled workers:
Z 1
0
b(z)h(ω; z)(1 + ωbh)
1 + ωh(ω; z)
dz = bh. (22)
Similarly, by adding the equilibrium conditions for low-skilled labor we find that
Z 1
0
b(z)(1 + ωbh)
1 + ωh(ω; z)
dz = 1. (23)
Putting together the results for both factors we have
φ(ωTFPE;bh) = Z 1
0
b(z)(1 + ωTFPEbh)
1 + ωh(ωTFPE; z)
h
h(ωTFPE; z)− bhi dz = 0, (24)
where ω = ωTFPE is the equilibrium skill premium with trade and factor price equalization.
Using (19) we conclude that opening to trade increases the skill premium in the home
economy (which has a high skill endowment) and decreases it in the foreign economy (see
Figure 1). Moreover, the eﬀect of opening to trade on the skill premium increases with
the diﬀerence in relative factor endowments. Since factor supply is assumed constant, the
relative wage bill of skilled workers in the home economy, S ≡ ωh, increases with trade. In
the foreign economy, where skill is scarce, trade decreases the relative wage bill of skilled
workers.
Because preferences for consumption goods are homothetic and identical, the skill compo-
sition of goods consumed in both economies is equal. The home economy employs more skill
in production, so it must be a net exporter of skill. When trade equalizes factor prices all
commodities can be produced at equal costs in both economies. The exact pattern of produc-
tion (and trade) is thus indeterminate, except in one important respect: the skill-abundant
economy will, on average, export skill-intensive goods. When trade leads to complete special-
ization, the pattern of trade is precisely determined, so the skill-abundant economy is also a
net exporter of skill. We therefore conclude that opening to trade shifts production towards
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skill-intensive goods in the skill-abundant economy; the opposite is true for the skill-scarce
economy.
Next consider the case where endowments diﬀer suﬃciently to give rise to complete
specialization without equalizing factor prices in the two economies. Suppose that the home
economy has a comparative advantage in producing a given good; then it has an advantage
in producing all goods that are more skill-intensive. Thus, when the two economies trade,
the home economy specializes in producing skill-intensive goods, while the foreign economy
specializes in producing goods that are less skill-intensive. The threshold commodity, z, is
determined in equilibrium, such that its cost of production is equal in both economies:
P (z) = P ∗ (z)⇒ wLa (z) + wHc (z) = w∗La∗ (z) + w∗Hc∗ (z) , (25)
where producing one unit of commodity z requires a(z) units of low-skilled labor and c(z)
units of high-skilled labor. Since the skill premium in the home economy is lower (ω < ω∗),
the threshold commodity is produced with a higher skill intensity in the home economy. The
home economy produces the goods in the range [0, z] and imports goods in the range [z, 1].
The total income in the home economy is wLL+wHH and a fraction θ ≡
Z z
0
b(z)dz of this
income is spent on imported goods. The condition of balanced trade is therefore
(wLL+ wHH) θ = (w∗LL
∗ + w∗HH
∗) (1− θ) . (26)
The equilibrium conditions in the markets for low- and high-skilled labor in the home
economy are
L=
Z z
0
a(z)b(z) [(wLL+ wHH) + (w∗LL
∗ + w∗HH
∗)]
P (z)
dz and
H =
Z z
0
c(z)b(z) [(wLL+ wHH) + (w∗LL∗ + w∗HH∗)]
P (z)
dz. (27)
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Combining these results with the balanced trade equation we get
Z z
0
b(z)(1 + ωh)
1 + ωh(ω; z)
[h(ω; z)− h] dz = 0. (28)
The unique equilibrium is characterized by the wage ratio in the home economy, ω = ωT .35
Skill intensity declines in z, so h(ω; z) < h for all z > z. We therefore conclude that
φ(ωT ;h) =
Z 1
0
b(z)(ωT + ωTh)
ωT + ωTh(ωT ; z)
[h(ω; z)− h] dz < 0. (29)
Comparing this result with the closed economy equilibrium and using the fact that φ
is decreasing in the skill premium, we conclude that ωT > ωA. Hence opening to trade
increases the skill premium in the home economy. A similar calculation for the foreign
economy indicates that it, too, has a unique skill premium, ωT∗, and that ωT∗ < ωA∗. In
other words, when the foreign economy opens to trade the skill premium in this economy
declines.
Since factor endowments are assumed constant in this case, trade increases the relative
wage bill of the locally abundant factor. In addition, since trade leads to specialization, each
economy clearly shifts production towards goods intensive in the locally abundant factor in
response to opening to trade.
Appendix B. Open Economy with Endogenous Migration
This Appendix extends the analysis to account for the possibility that workers migrate in
response to the change in relative wages induced by the opening to trade. I assume that
people diﬀer in their preferences for living in either of the two economies, and that their
35There is a unique equilibrium skill premium because the competitive equilibrium maximizes total output
with respect to (L,H,L∗,H∗), subject to the two resource constraints for each economy. The four endoge-
nously determined variables are the the skill premia in the two economies (ωT , ωT∗), the ratio of skilled
wages in the two economies (wH/w∗H), and the threshold commodity (z). The problem is convex, and hence
there is a unique solution.
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preferences are correlated with their skill:
Uijk = θ1
Z 1
0
b(z) ln di(z)dz + (1− θ1) ln eqi + θ2IijIik, (30)
where Uijk is the utility of a person i with skill level j ∈ {H,L}, and the subscript
k denotes home or foreign economy. The consumption of good z is denoted by di(z) and
housing is denoted by eqi. Iij is an indicator for whether person i is skilled, Iik is an indicator
for living in the home economy and θ2 is the preference of skilled workers for living in the
home economy. I assume that the supply of housing in each of the economies is constrained
by a fixed supply of land, eqk: Z
i
Iikeqidi = eqk. (31)
A group of high-skilled workers of measure 1 residing in economy k consumes dH (z) =
θ1b (z)
wHk
Pk(z)
units of good z and ωk?qk
(1+ωkh)Lk
units of housing. Similarly, a group of low-skilled
workers of measure 1 residing in economy k consumes dL (z) = θ1b (z)
wLk
Pk(z)
units of good
z and ?qk
(1+ωkh)Lk
units of housing. If all goods are produced at home (or if trade equalizes
factor prices) then dH (z) = θ1b (z)
ωkfz(h(ωk;z))
1+ωkh(ωk;z)
and dL (z) = θ1b (z)
fz(h(ωk;z))
1+ωkh(ωk;z)
.36 Hence their
indirect utility of type j residing in country k as a function of the skill premium and the
population of low-skilled workers is:
Uijk (ωk, Lk)= θ1
Z 1
0
b(z) ln
µ
θ1b (z)
(ωkIij + (1− Iij)) fz (h(ωk; z))
1 + ωkh(ωk; z)
¶
dz +
+(1− θ1) ln
µ
(ωkIij + (1− Iij))
(1 + ωkh)Lk
eqk¶+ θ2IjIk, (32)
where fz (h(ωk; z)) = Fz (H(z), L(z)) /L(z) is output per low-skilled worker in producing
good z.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of trade on the utility of both types, consider the utility
of a representative agent in economy k, who owns 1 unit of low-skilled labor and h units of
36To derive the last two equations notice that Pk (z) = a(z)wLk + c(z)wHk , h(z) = c(z)/a(z) and a(z) =
[fz (h(ωk; z))]−1 .
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high-skilled labor.37
Uik (ωk, Lk)= θ1
Z 1
0
b(z) ln
µ
θ1b (z)
(ωkh+ 1) fz (h(ωk; z))
1 + ωkh(ωk; z)
¶
dz +
+(1− θ1) ln
µ eqk
Lk
¶
. (33)
Assume that production functions are Cobb-Douglas and trade equalizes factor prices (before
migration takes place), so the elasticity of substitution between high- and low skilled labor
is one. In this case the relative wage bill of skilled workers in each industry, ωkh(ωk; z), is
constant. The first welfare theorem implies that the choice of inputs maximizes the welfare
of the representative agent (33). Since ωkh(ωk; z) is constant, the choice of inputs maximizes:Z 1
0
b(z) ln fz (h(ωk; z)) dz given ωk. Therefore, using the envelope theorem:
∂
∂ωk
∙Z 1
0
b(z) ln fz (h(ωk; z)) dz
¸
= 0. (34)
Using (34), we conclude that when production functions are Cobb-Douglas, ∂UiHk(ωk)∂ωk > 0
and ∂UiLk(ωk)∂ωk < 0, so high-skilled workers prefer a higher skill premium, while low-skilled
workers prefer a lower skill premium. Since ∂UiHk(ωk)∂Lk < 0 and
∂UiLk(ωk)
∂Lk
< 0, both types
prefer a lower population of low-skilled workers in their economy (holding relative wages
fixed), because a higher population implies higher housing prices. By continuity, these
results also hold if the elasticity of substitution in production of all goods is suﬃciently close
to one.
In order to analyze the equilibrium, it is convenient to begin by considering the case where
free migration is possible but there is no trade between the two economies. I focus on the case
where workers choose to live in both economies.38 If θ2 = 0 there is a symmetric equilibrium
37To simplify the analysis I assume that the representative agent derives no utility from living in either
economy.
38There are also two other equilibria in which all the workers reside in either of the two economies. In this
case no worker has an incentive to migrate, because production (and positive wages) are only possible with
both types of workers.
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in which both economies have an equal number of workers. To prove the existence and
uniqueness of this equilibrium, consider the conditions for indiﬀerence of the two types of
workers between the two economies. As figure A1 shows, the indiﬀerence curve of high-skilled
workers between the two economies (UH) is upward sloping in the space of the home economy
skill premium, ω, and the relative supply of low-skilled labor L/L∗, while the indiﬀerence
curve for low-skilled workers (UL) is downward sloping. Holding all else constant, as ω
approaches zero high-skilled workers require a lower level of L/L∗ than low-skilled workers
to be indiﬀerent between the two economies. Similarly, if ω is high enough, low skilled
workers require a lower level of L/L∗ than high-skilled workers for indiﬀerence. Since the
utility functions are continuous, there is a unique equilibrium combination of ω and L/L∗.
Given a fixed aggregate supply of high- and low-skilled labor in both economies together,
ω and L/L∗ determine a unique level of h in the home economy. This, in turn, implies a
unique level of employment of skilled workers in the foreign economy and hence a unique
skill premium ω∗.
Now consider the case where high-skill workers prefer to live in one of the two economies
(θ2 6= 0). Without loss of generality I assume that θ2 > 0, so ceteris paribus high-skilled
workers prefer to reside in the home economy. The indiﬀerence curve for the high-skilled
workers is below the indiﬀerence curve corresponding to θ2 = 0 (see indiﬀerence curve U 0H
Figure 1). In equilibrium the skill premium ω and the relative employment of low-skilled
labor (L/L∗) are lower. High-skill workers are indiﬀerent between the two economies because
the price and wage diﬀerentials oﬀset their preference for the home economy. Low-skilled
workers are also indiﬀerent because in the home economy they have higher wages and a
higher price of housing.
Suppose that θ2 > 0 and the economies open to trade with each other. Assume that
there is no initial response of migration and that factor endowments do not diﬀer too much,
so initially trade equalizes factor prices. The equilibrium analysis is identical to the cases
outlined without migration, except that now the fraction of income spent on each good z
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is a fraction θ1 of its share when there was no expenditure on housing. As we saw, trade
raises the skill premium in the home economy and decreases it in the foreign economy.
Since factor prices are equalized, high-skilled workers migrate to the home economy, raising
the price of housing. Therefore low-skilled workers migrate to the foreign economy. In
equilibrium, the wage premium in the home economy must be lower than in the foreign
economy (otherwise all high-skilled workers choose to reside in the home economy, as do all
low-skilled workers). However, if we assume that on aggregate high- and low-skilled labor
are not gross complements, trade increases the wage-bill share of the abundant factor in each
economy.
In summary, when migration is costless trade increases the wage-bill share of high-skilled
workers in the skill intensive economy by increasing their relative employment. To the extent
that migration is costly, the increase is mainly due to a change in relative wages. Migration
also induces a larger change in the composition of production due to Rybczynski eﬀects: an
increase in the share of high-skilled workers increases the skill content of production and
exports of the home economy.
Appendix C. Industrial Composition Data
The data on each county’s employment in 2-digit SIC industries are from the County Business
Patterns data set. For 1977-1997 I use publicly available data from the University of Virginia,
and for 1967 and 1972 I use data from the University of California Berkeley Data Center.
There are two important diﬀerences between the two sources of data. First, industries were
re-classified in the 1970s, so I exclude from the data SIC 19 (Ordinance), which only exists
for the earlier years. Second, the earlier data are reported only for county-industry cells with
100 employees or more or at least 10 establishments. Moreover, the data reports employment
by establishment size categories, which have changed slightly over time, and exact overall
employment is not reported for all counties. In order to solve these problems I assume that
the employment in an establishment with a given size category is the geometric average of the
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category’s two limits. I then use a regression to predict the employment in establishments
in the largest size category for each year. When total employment is not available I predict
it using a regression. Finally, to ensure comparability over time, I exclude county-industry
cells with less than 10 establishments or with fewer than 100 workers (or fewer than 100
predicted workers) for 1977-1997. Using this data I calculate the fraction of manufacturing
employees in each county, industry, and year.
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Full Sample With highway Without highway
Land Area 1950 959 988 1,238 906
Population 1950 48,699 19,378 24,858 17,590
Population density 1950 213 32 38 30
Population growth 1930-1950 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.001
Per capita income 1959 1,352 1,237 1,319 1,210
Earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita 1969 44 42 41 42
Retail sales per capita 1948 693 630 678 614
High-school graduates (of 25+ years old) 1950 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.25
Fraction commuting to work outside county 1970 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.19
Distance to nearest large city (miles) 84 92 78 96
Northeast 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
Midwest 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.38
South 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.47
West 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.11
Observations 3,101 2,000 492 1,508
Table 1. County descriptive statistics
Earliest data 
(post-WWII)
Notes:  The summary statistics are from the County and City Data books and from authors calculations using the National Transportation Atlas 
Databases, and they are calculated for all counties for which land area in known for 1950. Income, earnings, and sales data are in nominal US 
dollars.
Mean All counties
Sample counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Highway planned in 1944 legislation 0.795 0.798 0.842 0.789 0.785 0.780
(0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Direction to nearest city instrument 0.218 0.221 0.186 0.231 0.232 0.055 0.270
(0.051) (0.052) (0.034) (0.051) (0.048) (0.040) (0.048)
1950 population weights Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to nearest city No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic indicators None Region Region Region State None Region Region Region State Region Region
Table 2. Determinants of highway assignment to counties
Notes:  Cross-section regressions for sample counties. Columns 1-11 use full sample of counties (2000 observations) and column 12 uses only 
counties in the Midwest and the South (1647 observations). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Vehicle miles traveled (billions)
Rural 
Interstate 
Highways
Other 
highways
Fraction 
traveled 
on rural 
highways
Rural 
Interstate 
Highways
Other 
highways
Fraction 
traveled 
on rural 
highways
Rural 
Interstate 
Highways
Other 
highways
Fraction 
traveled 
on rural 
highways
Combination trucks 8.1 27.0 0.23 21.1 47.6 0.31 30.1 64.2 0.32
Single-unit trucks 2.0 25.1 0.07 4.0 35.8 0.10 5.7 46.2 0.11
Passenger cars and motorcycles 62.3 857.3 0.07 89.5 1,032.3 0.08 117.5 1,300.3 0.08
Other vehicles 7.1 120.7 0.06 20.5 276.5 0.07 46.9 533.4 0.08
Total 79.5 1,030.2 0.07 135.1 1,392.2 0.09 200.2 1,944.2 0.09
Table 3. Vehicle miles traveled on rural interstate highway, by vehicle type
Notes:  The data are from Highway Statistics, 1995-2000. The figures include vehicle miles traveled on toll highways incorporated into the 
Interstate Highway System, since data for those segments are not reported separately.
1970 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1972 0.022 0.026 0.009 0.028 0.027
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
1977 0.074 0.084 0.069 0.083 0.077
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
1982 0.061 0.079 0.083 0.093 0.082
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037)
1987 0.078 0.090 0.090 0.100 0.088
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
1992 0.115 0.149 0.158 0.154 0.144
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
1997 0.041 0.086 0.117 0.093 0.089
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Observations 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220
Weights Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region*year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance*year No No No Yes Yes
1950 Pop. density*year No No No No Yes
Table 4. Effect of highways on ln(earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita)
Notes:  All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies. 
Each column reports highway*year interactions from a seperate regression, and the omitted interaction 
is highway*1969. The weights are 1950 population. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are clustered 
at the county level. Distance denotes the distance in miles from the county centroid to the nearest large 
city. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1954 -0.013 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
1958 -0.031 -0.018 -0.032 -0.016 -0.011
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
1963 -0.029 -0.011 -0.033 -0.007 -0.003
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
1967 -0.027 -0.001 -0.019 -0.005 -0.002
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
1972 0.023 0.042 0.032 0.033 0.032
(0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
1977 0.034 0.053 0.051 0.045 0.043
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
1982 0.057 0.078 0.078 0.072 0.070
(0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
1987 0.076 0.102 0.107 0.086 0.080
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
1992 0.087 0.110 0.118 0.095 0.089
(0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
1997 0.101 0.135 0.149 0.123 0.117
(0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 21,839 21,839 21,839 21,839 21,839
Weights Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region*year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance*year No No No Yes Yes
1950 Pop. density*year No No No No Yes
Table 5. Effect of highways on ln(retail sales per capita)
Notes:  All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies. 
Each column reports highway*year interactions from a seperate regression, and the omitted interaction 
is highway*1948. The weights are 1950 population. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are clustered 
at the county level. Distance denotes the distance in miles from the county centroid to the nearest large 
city. 
1944 plan
Midwest 
and South
Full 
Sample
Full 
Sample
Midwest 
and South
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Highway*(post-1975) 0.082 0.086 0.107 0.081 0.071 0.063 0.082 0.121 0.144
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.086) (0.082)
Observations 15,854 15,854 15,854 15,854 15,854 13,053 15,854 15,854 13,053
Highway*(post-1975) 0.063 0.084 0.098 0.074 0.082 0.088 0.054 0.070 0.180
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043) (0.228) (0.217)
Observations 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220 12,220 10,099 12,220 12,220 10,099
Highway*(post-1975) 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.031 0.024
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 4,815 5,874 5,874 4,815
Full Sample
Direction to city
Notes:  All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are 
clustered by county. Each cell reports the coefficient on highway*(post-1975) interaction from a separate regression. Columns 2-9 control for 
region-specific year effects. All regressions are weighted using the 1950 population, except column 3 which is unweighted. Column 4 uses an 
index of highway completion, by state, instead of a post-1975 indicator. Columns 5-9 control for (distance to nearest city)*year and (1950 
population density)*year interactions. Columns 6 and 9 limit the sample to the regions where the first stage is significant for the direction 
instrument (the Midwest and the South). 
A. Dependent variable: ln(retail sales per capita): 1963-1997
B. Dependent variable: ln(earnings in trucking and warehousing per capita): 1969-1997
C. Dependent variable: fraction commuting to work outside their county of residence: 1970-1990
OLS IV
Table 6. Effect of highways on trade and commuting
Instrument
1944 
plan
Direction 
to city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Post-1975)*highway 0.006 -0.149 -0.168 -0.151 -0.101 -0.223 -1.370
(0.024) (0.069) (0.068) (0.077) (0.069) (0.094) (2.049)
(Post-1975)*highway*(1950 hs) 0.623 0.609 0.564 0.456 0.802 4.177
(0.249) (0.241) (0.262) (0.247) (0.312) (5.960)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school) -0.443 -0.323 -0.208 -0.077 -0.278 -1.200
(0.148) (0.213) (0.255) (0.093) (0.271) (1.683)
Observations 5,795 5,795 5,793 4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455
(Post-1975)*highway -0.051 -0.129 -0.113 -0.113 -0.069 -0.136 -1.259
(0.020) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.077) (1.573)
(Post-1975)*highway*(1950 hs) 0.313 0.274 0.274 0.130 0.312 3.098
(0.202) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.262) (4.563)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school) -0.251 -0.479 -0.479 0.022 -0.484 -1.145
(0.134) (0.220) (0.220) (0.085) (0.230) (1.285)
Observations 4,456 4,456 4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455
(Post-1975)*highway 0.063 -0.004 -0.037 -0.038 -0.032 -0.087 -0.111
(0.027) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.075) (0.096) (1.646)
(Post-1975)*highway*(1950 hs) 0.264 0.289 0.290 0.326 0.490 1.079
(0.278) (0.267) (0.267) (0.268) (0.320) (4.808)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school) -0.134 0.276 0.272 -0.099 0.206 -0.055
(0.179) (0.257) (0.258) (0.103) (0.276) (1.373)
Observations 4,461 4,461 4,460 4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455
Table 7. Effect of highways on the demand for skill in manufacturing
OLS IV
Instrument
Notes:  All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies. 
All estimates use data for 1967-1982, and include 1950 population weights. Robust standards errors in 
parenthesis are clustered by county. Columns 1-3 use the full sample, and columns 4-7 use a fixed 
sample size across panels.  Columns 3-7 control for region*year, (distance to nearest city)*year, and 
(1950 population density)* year interactions, and the fraction of high-school graduates among 25+ year-
olds. Column 5 uses a state-level index of the fraction of highways completed. 
A. Dependent variable: ln(relative wage-bill of non-production workers)
B. Dependent variable: ln(relative wage of non-production workers)
C. Dependent variable: ln(relative employment of non-production workers)
1944 plan
direction to 
city
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highway -0.069 -0.052 0.049 0.209
(0.120) (0.119) (0.159) (1.385)
Highway*(1950 high school) 0.476 0.322 -0.062 -0.814
(0.415) (0.414) (0.524) (4.200)
(1950 high school) -0.547 -0.754 -0.639 -0.391
(0.248) (0.381) (0.394) (1.178)
Highway -0.140 -0.134 -0.228 0.719
(0.089) (0.089) (0.106) (1.307)
Highway*(1950 high school) 0.736 0.655 0.929 -2.202
(0.309) (0.309) (0.360) (3.920)
(1950 high school) -0.335 -0.098 -0.167 0.702
(0.199) (0.280) (0.298) (1.091)
Highway 0.047 0.082 0.077 -0.114
(0.076) (0.075) (0.102) (1.156)
Highway*(1950 high school) -0.076 -0.233 -0.125 1.171
(0.275) (0.261) (0.344) (3.464)
(1950 high school) 0.243 -0.070 -0.116 -0.592
(0.169) (0.241) (0.245) (0.932)
Notes:  Cross section regression using a fixed subsample of 1,072 counties for which data exists in 
1947,1967,1982 and 1992. Columns 2-4 control for region dummies, distance to nearest city, and 1950 
population density. Robust standards errors are in parenthesis.
Table 8. Effect of highways on the demand for skill in manufacturing
A. Before highway construction was complete: 1947-1967
B. When highway construction was being completed: 1967-1982
C. After the construction of highways was complete: 1982-1992
Dependent variable: change in ln(relative 
wage-bill of non-production workers)
IVOLS
Instrument
1944 plan Direction to city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Post-1975)*highway -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 0.032
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.126)
(Post-1975)*highway*(1950 hs) 0.020 0.030 0.032 0.035 -0.075
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.040) (0.386)
(Post-1975)*(1950 high school) 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.031 0.052
(0.017) (0.026) (0.009) (0.027) (0.096)
Observations 5,818 5,818 5,813 5,813 5,813 5,813
Table 9. Effect of highways on industrial composition of manufacturing employment
OLS
Notes:  All estimates are from a panel of the sample counties that includes county and year dummies. All estimates use data for 1967-1982, and 
include 1950 population weights. Robust standards errors in parenthesis are clustered by county. Columns 3-6 control for region*year, 
(distance to nearest city)*year, and (1950 population density)*year interactions, and the fraction of high-school graduates among 25+ year-
olds. Column 4 uses a state-level index of the fraction of highways completed. 
Dependent variable: index of 
non-production worker intensity
IV
Instrument
Figure 1. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium skill premium without migration. Holding the endowment 
fixed (along each of the curves),    is positive for low skill premia and negative for high skill premia. Since it is 
continuous and decreasing in the skill premium there is a unique equilibrium skill premium such that
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Figure 2. Routes of the recommended interregional highway system, 1944 plan. Source: U.S. House of 
Representatives, Interregional Highways, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, House document no. 
379, 78th congress, 2nd session, January 1944 
Figure 3. The Interstate Highway System in September 1966. Source: Bureau of Public Roads.
Figure 4. The Interstate Highway System in December 1975. Source: Federal Highway Administration.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Interstate Highway System in 2002. Black lines denote highways segments included in the sample 
and grey lines denote highway segments excluded from the sample. Black dots denote cities that had a population 
of 100,000 or more or were the largest in their state in 1950. 
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Figure 6. The direction to the nearest city and the probability an interstate highway crosses a rural county. The 
probability is estimated using a kernel regression with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 20.
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Figure 7. Ln(vehicle miles traveled), by vehicle type (base year is 1966). Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway Policy Information, Highway Statistics
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Figure 8. The effect of highways on trade in rural counties. The figure reports the coefficients on highway*year 
interactions from Column 4 in Tables 4 and 5. Open points represent coefficients not significant at the 5 percent level.
Figure A1. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with migration.
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